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Historically, the law helped impecunious plaintiffs overcome their inherent disadvantage 
in civil litigation. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case: modern law has largely 
abandoned the mission of assisting the least well off. In this Essay, we propose a new 
remedy that can dramatically improve the fortunes of poor plaintiffs and thereby change 
the errant path of the law: preliminary damages. The unavailability of preliminary 
damages has dire implications for poor plaintiffs, especially those wronged by affluent 
individuals and corporations. Resource constrained plaintiffs cannot afford prolonged 
litigation on account of their limited financial means. Consequently, they are forced to 
either forego suing altogether or accept unfavorable and unjust settlements to alleviate 
their financial plight. Aware of this reality, corporate defendants have an inherent 
incentive to break the law and then strategically drag on trials in order to force victims 
who lack the financial wherewithal into unfair settlements. As we show, preliminary 
damage awards will rectify these distortions. By providing poor victims the financial 
oxygen they badly need and by eliminating the incentive of rich wrongdoers to drag 
litigation unnecessarily, preliminary damage awards will not only level the litigation 
playfield, but will also free up considerable judicial resources.   
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In a powerful article, titled Poverty and Civil Litigation, that appeared nearly a 
century ago in the Harvard Law Review,1 John MacArthur Maguire lamented the 
fact that poor litigants had been stripped of the special protections afforded to 
them by ancient legal systems.2 He cautioned against the consequences of this 
regressive trend, pointing out that poverty “blocks a civil litigant’s path at every 
stage of the proceeding”3 and that resource constrained plaintiff must “surmount 
four financial barriers: costs, fees, expense of legal services, and sundry 
miscellaneous expenses incident to litigation.”4 
From a purely theoretical standpoint, our legal system’s commitment to the ideal 
of helping impecunious plaintiffs has never waned. In A Theory of Justice—
arguably, the most influential book in political philosophy—John Rawls has 
forcefully argued that legal institutions ought to be fashioned to the benefit of the 
least well-off.5 In practice, however, our legal institutions systematically fail to 
meet this standard. In tune with Maguire’s assessment, the realities of the 
American civil litigation system are a far cry from the Rawlsian ideal.6 Poor 
litigants, on account of their limited resources, often do not get to have their day 
in court or receive a remedy for the wrongs inflicted on them.7 This is especially 
true for the least well-off members of our society when they find themselves paired 
up as plaintiffs with well-to-do defendants. Justice comes at a cost: it is 
administered through litigation, and the cost of litigation in the United States is 
prohibitive for economically disenfranchised victims, who do not have the 
financial means to pursue their rightful causes of action. 
Astoundingly, this troubling reality emanates from a seemingly benign feature of 
the legal system that we all take for granted: the unavailability of preliminary damages. 
Our legal system addresses civil wrongs via the mechanisms of injunctions and 
damages.8 Yet, there is a fundamental difference between the two. While 
                                                   
1  John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923). 
2  Id. at 361-65. 
3  Id. at 362. 
4 Id. 
5  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-13 (1971). 
6 See Maguire, supra note 1, at 361-65. 
7  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Book Review: Examining the Case for Socialized Law, 
129 YALE L.J. 2078, 2080 (2020) (noting “collective frustration that our legal and political 
institutions have failed to protect us from the pernicious effects of economic polarization.”). 
8  See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION § 1.1 at 2 (2d ed. 
2003). 
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injunctions come in two modes—preliminary and permanent9—damages come in 
only one mode—permanent.10 Preliminary damages are a virtually non-existent 
legal species. Damages are only awarded at the end of the trial after the issue of 
liability has been settled.11 As long as the question of the defendant’s liability is 
pending, the plaintiff cannot collect damages. Accordingly, plaintiffs who seek a 
preliminary injunction to protect their rights can receive a timely remedy, while 
plaintiffs who desperately need an interim monetary payment have no such 
option. 
This state of affairs is anomalous. If courts can award plaintiffs preliminary 
injunctions before the conclusion of a trial, why can’t they award preliminary 
damages? Or, contrariwise, if no damages can be awarded until liability is found, 
how is it that preliminary injunctions can be granted?  
The asymmetry between injunctions and damages is not a mere nicety. The 
unavailability of preliminary damages is the root cause of great injustice and 
inefficiency. Disempowered rightsholders and ordinary people who were harmed 
by affluent wrongdoers—financial institutions, insurance companies, hospitals and 
other large corporations—often do not have the financial resources to litigate.12 
                                                   
9  Id. § 2.11(1) at 249–50. See also John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 528–30 (1978).  
10  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 1.1 at 3–5. Exceptionally, our law allows spouses and children to 
recover temporary alimony and child support payments: see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. 
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1309–11 (1998). Notably, in 
England, in France and in Israel, victims of automobile and other accidents can recover 
compensation advancements ahead of trial when the defendant is likely or indisputably liable 
for their injuries: see ADRIAN A. S. ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 344–49 (2003) (discussing 
rules entitling plaintiffs in the UK to recover interim payments for personal injuries); Farrah 
Mauladad, Interim Payments—Do They Have to be Necessary?, 2005 (2) J. PERS. INJURY L. 180 
(surveying English system of interim compensation payments to personal injury victims); 
David Corbe-Chalon & Martin A. Rogoff, Tort Reform À La Francaise: Jurisprudential and Policy 
Perspectives on Damages for Bodily Injury in France, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231, 286 (2007) (“In cases 
where there is considerable delay in the consolidation of the victim’s injuries, he may receive 
an interim payment before final settlement.”); The Law of Compensation to Road Accident 
Victims 1975, §§ 5A-5G (Isr.) (hereinafter: Israeli Compensation Law) (setting up compensation 
advancements scheme for road accident victims under no-fault liability regime); Ronen Perry, 
From Fault-Based to Strict Liability: A Case Study of an Overpraised Reform, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
383, 409–13 (2018) (analyzing Israeli scheme of compensation advancements). For a proposal 
to recognize an injunctive relief allowing personal injury victims in the United States to 
recover similar payments, see Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions to 
Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–49 (1990). For a study of voluntary 
arrangements to pay claimants interim compensation, see Julie E. Steiner, Interim Payments and 
Economic Damages to Compensate Private-Party Victims of Hazardous Releases, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1313 
(2015). 
11  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 1.1 at 3. 
12  See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs, 
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Naturally, the longer and costlier the trial, the greater is the disincentive to bring 
an action or to litigate to a final judgment.13 This asymmetry does not affect 
corporate and other strong defendants.14 Aware of this reality, well-funded 
potential defendants have an inherent incentive to drag out legal processes in an 
attempt to exhaust ill-funded plaintiffs.15 This strategy does not only exhaust poor 
rightsholders, but also depletes the resources of the court system.16 It foments 
prolonged litigation, the goal of which is not to achieve a more accurate result or a 
better legal precedent, but rather to ensure that the suit is ultimately dropped, or 
settled on unfair grounds, even though it is meritorious.17  
Our goal is in this Essay is to establish the case for the introduction of preliminary 
damages into our civil litigation system. To this end we advance three claims. 
First, we show that there is no prudential or policy bar to the introduction of 
preliminary damages. The reason for the unavailability of preliminary damages in 
our legal system is purely historical.18 Damages have developed in the common 
law system as the sole remedy for violations of legal entitlements.19 Injunctions, by 
contrast, were a staple of equity—a system that implemented broad principles of 
justice to rectify the rigidity and inequities of the formal law.20 The historical 
distinction between injunctions and damages has been blurred over time to the 
point that it no longer exists under our legal system. Adding preliminary damages 
to the remedial menu is therefore fully consistent with modern jurisprudential 
                                                                                                                                           
102 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1331 (2017). 
13  Id. at 1332–33. 
14  Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–110 (1974). 
15  See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 12, at 1346–47 (showing how insurance companies drag 
out legal processes to force worn-out plaintiffs into cheap settlements). 
16  See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 10, at 1319 (“Delay affects a victim’s financial stability, causes 
stress, and can detour a victim’s funds away from supporting sound health and lifestyle 
choices. . . . The threat of delayed compensation puts pressure on the victims to settle their 
claims for less than full value in order to achieve more rapid payment and permits the polluter 
to at least temporarily shift the cost of harm to the victim.”); Daniel A. Fulco, Delaware’s 
Response to Inefficient, Costly Court Systems and a Comparison to Federal Reform, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
937, 963 (1995) (“Costs and delay represent compelling problems affecting our nation’s 
federal and state court systems.”); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: 
Irrational Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 40, 48 (1986) (“The delay 
and cost involved in the tort litigation system, in themselves, supply ample justification for civil 
justice reforms. . . . Reforms are needed to assure reasonable, timely compensation, to 
preserve access to the courts for injured parties, and to discourage wrongful conduct.”). 
17  See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 1313, 1318 (2012). 
18  See infra Part I. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. See also Leubsdorf, supra note 9, at 532–34 (mentioning historical connection between 
injunctive relief and equity). 
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trends. Importantly, our call to introduce preliminary damages is not based 
exclusively on theoretical and prudential arguments. It has empirical support.21 
Preliminary damages have already been recognized in discrete areas of the law. In 
the United Kingdom, the birthplace of common law and equity, victims of torts 
are entitled to receive interim payments for personal injuries.22 In the United 
States, preliminary monetary awards exist in divorce cases.23 These examples 
prove that there is no reason to fear that the introduction of preliminary damages 
on a broader basis, under appropriate conditions, will jeopardize the working of 
our courts.  
Second, we demonstrate that the same doctrinal safeguards that apply to the grant 
of preliminary injunctions can work with preliminary damages as well.24 Under 
our proposal, a party seeking preliminary damages has to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits and that the balance of equities tips in her favor.25 
Furthermore, preliminary damage awards cannot exceed fifty percent of the total 
damages sought by the plaintiff.26 
Third, we posit that the normative case for recognizing preliminary damages is 
compelling. There are weighty policy reasons that support the award of 
preliminary damages in civil cases.  Allowing preliminary damages will go a long 
way toward leveling the litigation playfield, making it not only fairer, but also 
more efficient.  The introduction of preliminary damages will induce the filing of 
meritorious suits by plaintiffs who do not have the financial wherewithal to 
litigate. Court decisions granting this interlocutory remedy will also generate 
reliable information for litigation funders, thereby helping deserving plaintiffs to 
secure the oft-needed funding for prosecuting their suits.27 
It is important to note in this context that our doctrinal safeguards ensure this 
result: only plaintiffs with real likelihood of success on the merits will be able to 
avail themselves of the new remedy.28 Another salutary effect of our proposal is 
that it will enable poor plaintiffs who filed suit to see their case through, without 
fearing delay tactics. The availability of preliminary damages will dramatically 
reduce, if not completely eliminate, the incentive of well-endowed defendants to 
employ delay tactics in order to exhaust the weak plaintiff.29 This, in turn, will 
                                                   
21  See supra note 10 and sources cited therein. 
22  See Mauladad, supra note 10. 
23  See Scott & Scott, supra note 10, at 1309–11. 
24  See infra Part III. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  See infra Part III.B. 
29  See infra Part III.A. 
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improve the operation of our court system as a whole. As importantly, the 
introduction of preliminary damages constitutes a fairer and cheaper way of 
helping poor plaintiffs than litigation funds and other mechanisms of third-party 
funding that deprive plaintiffs of a substantial part of the compensation to which 
they are entitled.30 
This Essay will proceed in the following order. In Part I, we will set up the 
doctrinal and historical background for our normative claim that favors the 
introduction of preliminary damages. In Part II, we will address the inequities and 
inefficiencies that our system of litigation can eliminate by allowing potentially 
deserving plaintiffs to recover preliminary damages from defendants. In Part III, 
we will develop our proposal to introduce preliminary damages and the 
accompanying safeguards into the law of remedies. In Part IV, we will raise 
possible objections to our proposal and respond to those objections. A short 
Conclusion will follow. 
 
I. Path Dependence in the Law of Remedies 
The wrongdoing-remedy mechanism is as old as law itself.31 Since time 
immemorial, remedies followed wrongs not only pursuant to a self-explanatory 
principle of liability, but also as a matter of courts’ procedures. Procedurally, a 
plaintiff could recover compensation or receive another remedy only upon 
convincing the court that she was wronged by the defendant. Absent a court  
ruling to that effect, a plaintiff is not entitled to a remedy.32  
This procedural chronology was—and, remarkably, still is—a product of two 
mutually related doctrines: the presumption of civility33 and the burden of proof.34 
The presumption of civility holds that a defendant cannot be deemed a 
wrongdoer without proof that she committed a wrong against the plaintiff.35 
Correspondingly, the plaintiff must convince the court that she was wronged by 
                                                   
30  See infra notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text. 
31  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.1(2) at 55–59. 
32  Id. § 1.1 at 3. This basic requirement originates from corrective justice: see ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56–58 (2012). 
33  See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 655–71 
(1994); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and Transcendentalism—You Prove It! Why Should 
I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 714 (1994). 
34  See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 484 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“The most 
acceptable meaning to be given to the expression, proof by a preponderance, seems to be 
proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable 
than its nonexistence.”). 
35  See Nance, supra note 33, at 648. 
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the defendant.36 To this end, the plaintiff must ordinarily prove that she had a 
right obligating the defendant to act or abstain from acting in a certain way, that 
the defendant violated his obligation, and that she suffered harm as a result of the 
violation.37 Absent such proof, the defendant will be presumed to have acted 
lawfully, pursuant to the presumption of civility.38  
These rules can be traced back to ancient legal systems that were driven by 
religious ideas,39 and to the writings of the founder of deontological moral 
philosophy, Immanuel Kant, who saw in the presumption of civility a real-world 
illustration of his famous categorical imperative—the demand for any moral rule 
to be universalizable, that is, applicable across the board without exceptions—and 
the related principle that a person be treated not just as a means to an end, but 
rather as an end in and of itself.40 Based on these ideas, legal systems categorically 
refused to force a defendant to remedy an alleged wrong unless the court 
concluded that the defendant was a wrongdoer, responsible for the plaintiff’s 
harm. Over time, these rules have been modernized and refined, but the core 
ideas underlying them remain unchanged. 
It is important to notice the tradeoff between these and other proof requirements 
and the duration of trials. In the old days, trial was a quick and simple matter: the 
judge would listen to the parties, consider the evidence limited by the formalities 
of the trial41 and short supply, and deliver a parsimoniously reasoned decision.42 
This trial format often produced miscarriage of justice.43  
                                                   
36  Id. at 655–71 (illustrating how the presumption of civility works). 
37  See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 212 (2005). 
38  See Nance, supra note 33, at 655–71. 
39  See TALMUD BAVLI, BAVA KAMA 46a (presenting and illustrating the Halachic rule “He who 
comes to take from his fellow must prove his right”); ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC 
DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 652 (1991) (“ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat” (he who 
affirms has to prove, not he who denies)). 
40  See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 33, § 8, at 77 [Ak. 255–56] (1797) (Mary Gregor trans., 1991). (“I am . . . not under 
obligation to leave . . . objects belonging to others untouched unless everyone else provides me 
assurance that he will behave in accordance with the same principle with regard to what is 
mine. . . . [A] unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone . . . since that would 
infringe upon freedom in accordance with universal laws. So it is only a will putting everyone 
under obligation, hence only a collective general (common) and powerful will, that can 
provide everyone this assurance.” See also Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1556–61 (1996).   
41  On these formalities, see SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3–4 (1754) 
(Garland Publishing., 1979); WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 34–38 (1990); 
Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 
36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1150–51 (1990). 
42  See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 37–50 (1949). 
43  Id. 
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Modernization of the law has made virtually every relevant evidence admissible as 
proof of liability (or lack thereof) and put in place a different tradeoff between 
time, formalities, and accuracy.44 Rectitude of decision has become the principal 
goal of the trial.45 En route to this goal, the legal system has set up rules that 
increased the supply of evidence in courtrooms,46 thereby transforming the trial 
process into a series of interactions among parties, attorneys and courts. These 
interactions involved production and examination of testimonial, documentary 
and physical evidence followed by the application of complex legal rules. Trials 
have consequently become more time-consuming.47 
The obvious benefit of that development was an enhancement of accuracy of 
courts’ determinations of litigants’ rights, duties and liabilities.48 This benefit, 
however, came at a price. The price of the improved accuracy came in the form 
of prolonged trials that undermined rightsholders’ ability to realize their rights 
and receive a remedy in a timely fashion.49 Such delays did not merely postpone 
the right’s enforcement and realization, and, correspondingly, the rightsholder’s 
ability to enjoy it. Oftentimes, they eroded the value of the right itself, thereby 
confirming the saying “Justice delayed is justice denied.”50 The legal system 
consequently had to address the problem of untimely relief.51 To solve that 
problem, the system had to find ways of adjusting its remedies. 
Among these remedies, the most common, most flexible and, consequently most 
adjustable was money.52 The defendant’s postponed performance of her 
                                                   
44  See Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 279, 281–83 (1996). 
45  Id. at 284. 
46  Id. at 285–89. See also TWINING, supra note 41, at 35–98 (describing and explaining shift to 
rationalism in factfinding). 
47  See, e.g., Lindsay Farmer, Whose Trial? Comments on A Theory of the Trial, 28 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 547, 549–50 (2003) (“The modern trial is longer, more complex (as a result of the 
multiplication and refinement of procedural and evidential rules), and more legalistic than its 
predecessors.”). 
48  See TWINING, supra note 41, at 35–98 (describing modernization of evidence law and its 
reorientation towards ascertainment of empirical facts). 
49  See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
307 (1994) (analyzing tradeoffs between accuracy and its costs in adjudication). For further 
development of this idea and its critique, see Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 
(2012) (developing a system of liability based on probability distributions and arguing that it 
offers an optimal balance between accuracy and its cost); Ronald J. Allen & Alex 
Stein, Evidence, Probability, and Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 579–93 (2013) (criticizing 
Kaplow’s theory for being incompatible with basic legal concepts and structure of liability). 
50  See Adrian A. S. Zuckerman, Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure—The Case for Commuting 
Correct Judgments for Timely Judgments, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 360–62 (1994). 
51  Id. at 366–68. 
52   See Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a Specific Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 158 (2006) (“A 
fundamental distinction in the law of remedies is the difference between specific and 
substitutionary relief. Specific relief gives the plaintiff the original thing to which the plaintiff is 
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obligation to the plaintiff was analogized to borrowing.53 When the obligation 
involves a payment of money—such as compensation for tortious injuries—the 
analogy is straightforward: a person who delays a payment owed to another 
effectively borrows money (or takes a loan) from that individual. The analogy is 
also valid, albeit less straightforward, with respect to non-monetary obligations.54 
Non-monetary obligations, too, confer a benefit on rightsholders and the unlawful 
denial of the benefit deprives the rightholder of economic value.   
The borrowing analogy explains how interest was introduced into our system of 
remedies.55 To compensate a rightsholder for the delayed realization of her 
entitlement, courts added interest to the monetary awards wrongdoers were 
ordered to pay their victims, with the interest amount calculated as of the day of 
the wrong.56 Courts also used money to compensate deserving plaintiffs 
confronted by unscrupulous defendants who resorted to mala fides tactics, such as 
raising unmeritorious defenses,57 denying the plaintiff her dues and delaying the 
legal process in the hopes that the plaintiff will abandon her suit or agree to a 
cheap settlement rather than fight an uphill battle.58 To deter defendants from 
resorting to such tactics and incentivize plaintiffs not to give up, courts increased 
the aggrieved plaintiffs’ award by allowing them to recover punitive damages on 
top of compensatory damages.59 
According to a widespread belief, these measures have solved the problem of 
untimely relief in many cases.60 In other cases, the grant of a larger amount of 
money does not take care of the problem. These cases fall into two categories. The 
first category involves rights, whose violation cannot be fully rectified by the 
payment of monetary damages.  To list a few examples, consider a plaintiff 
challenging disenfranchisement to secure her right to participate in the upcoming 
                                                                                                                                           
or was entitled; substitutionary relief gives the plaintiff something other than its original 
entitlement. The most common form of substitutionary relief is money.”). 
53  DOBBS, supra note 8, § 3.2 at 291. 
54  Id.  
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions under Amended Federal Rule 11—Some Chilling 
Problems in the Struggle between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1320 n.50 (1986); 
Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical, Comparative Study, 
75 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 368 (1992). 
58  For such tactics, see supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
59  See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future 
of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 479 (2008); and see generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) 
(analyzing deterrence as a rationale for assessing punitive damages). Cf. State Farm Mut. 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (subjecting punitive damages to 
constitutional scrutiny). 
60  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 3.2 at 291. 
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elections; a plaintiff claiming ownership over a piece of land that is about to be 
sold to a third party; or a woman who wishes to exercise her abortion right under 
Roe v. Wade61 and asking the court to remove a state-imposed impediment to 
abortion. In these and similar cases, a deserving plaintiff will only be able to 
realize her right by obtaining a timely remedy in the form of specific performance 
or an injunction.62  
For these types of cases, our legal system has devised remedies known as equitable 
relief.63 The word “equitable” refers to the rules associated with equity, as 
distinguished from common law.64 Those rules have been developed a long time 
ago by the courts of equity, as distinguished from common law courts that could 
only grant a remedy in the form of money.65 The courts of equity were set up to 
provide rightful plaintiffs with specific performance and injunctive remedies that 
money could not buy.66 To obtain such a remedy, the plaintiff had to prove her 
right, to show that she pursues it in good faith and thus “comes to court with clean 
hands”67 and—critically—to convince the court that money does not constitute an 
adequate remedy.68 
These rules and the concept of equitable relief remain in force today, many 
decades after the unification of the equity and common law courts.69 To ensure 
the viability of the plaintiff’s equitable relief, the legal system had to protect it 
against external changes that occur during the trial process and have the potential 
to vitiate the plaintiff’s ability to receive an effective remedy.70 This problem was 
especially acute in the case of ongoing violations that threatened to deprive the 
rightholder of the possibility of recompense at the end of the trial. The solution 
came in the form of preliminary (or interlocutory) remedies that a plaintiff could 
recover in equity, but not at common law, prior to the disposition of her suit.71  
                                                   
61  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
62  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.1(2) at 58; 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–
EQUITY–RESTITUTION § 12.8(1) at 189–94 (2d ed. 2003). 
63  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.1(2) at 60–61. 
64  Id. § 2.1(1) at 55–56. See also John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by Equitable: The Supreme 
Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1366 
(2003). 
65  See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 919 (1987). 
66  Id. at 919–20. 
67  JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 90 (5th ed., 1941). 
68  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.9(2) at 228. 
69  Id. § 2.1(2) at 58–59. See also Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States 
Courts, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283, 285–90 (1928) (describing the fusion of law and equity as a 
rationalizing movement). 
70  DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.1(2) at 59–60; § 2.11(1) at 249–50. 
71  Id. 
REMEDY4LEASTWELLOFF.DOC 2/27/2021 9:16 PM 
12                    A Remedy for the Least Well-Off [Vol. nnn:nnn 
 
Preliminary (or interlocutory) remedies ran the gamut of various injunctive and 
mandamus orders aiming to forestall irreparable harm to the plaintiff.72 The 
concept of irreparable harm referred, as it still does, to changes in the situation 
that will render the relief the plaintiff might be deserving of at the end of the trial 
ineffectual.73 To prove that the harm the plaintiff stands to incur, if the 
preliminary injunction is not granted, will be irreparable, the plaintiff has to show 
that her entitlement cannot be replaced by money.74 As a corollary, a delay in the 
realization of the right to recover money from the defendant has been excluded 
from the definition of irreparable harm: courts have unanimously treated “more 
money tomorrow” as an adequate substitute for “less money today.”75 
The second category of cases for which delayed payment of greater compensation 
does not work involves lawsuits in which the plaintiff cannot afford the longer 
wait. The cost of lawsuits is an oft-discussed problem.76 Naturally, the high cost of 
justice in the United States does not affect all litigants equally. It has a disparate 
impact on rightsholders who face serious resource constraints, and, consequently, 
cannot shoulder the cost of the legal process.77  For such plaintiffs, the critical 
factor is not the size of the award but rather the timing thereof.78 Allowing them 
to recover more money later is, therefore, pointless.79 Preliminary injunctions are 
of no use for such plaintiffs, either. They are not looking to stop an ongoing 
violation of the plaintiff’s right. The only remedy that can help such plaintiffs is 
preliminary damages. Yet, this remedy is presently unavailable. 
The reason for the unavailability of preliminary damages under the extant system 
of remedies is predominantly historical. The rules of equity, as developed by the 
English Chancery Court and subsequently incorporated in the laws of the United 
States,80 afford plaintiffs who are yet to win the case only injunctive remedies.81 
For that historical reason, there is no such thing as interlocutory financial relief. 
                                                   
72  Id. § 2.1(2) at 59–61; § 2.11(2) at 253–57. 
73  Id. 
74  See, e.g., American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd. 780 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Judge Posner’s cost-benefit formula for preliminary injunctions); Leubsdorf, supra note 9, at 
541–42; see also Richard R. W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic 
Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 390–92 (2005) (criticizing 
Posner’s and Leubsdorf’s formulations of plaintiffs’ entitlement to preliminary injunction). 
75  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.11(2) at 260–63. 
76  See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (demonstrating that enforcement costs crucially affect legal 
entitlements and integrating them into general philosophy of rights). 
77  See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1344–45. 
78  Id. at 1352. See also Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 225, 229–30 (1997). 
79  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
80  See DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.1(2) at 58–59. 
81  Id. 
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Indeed, the grip of path dependence on our law of remedies is so strong82 that 
even legal theorists who observed the injustice suffered by impecunious plaintiffs 
attempted to fashion a remedy for them in the form of a new preliminary 
injunction, as opposed to preliminary damages that constitute the most sensible 
and straightforward solution to individual plaintiffs’ plight.83 As a normative 
matter, this state of affairs can hardly be justified. The history of equity and the 
English Chancery Court is both interesting and instructive. Yet, as we will 
demonstrate in the pages ahead, it is totally divorced from the realities of the 
modern civil litigation, denies plaintiffs access to justice, and oftentimes leaves 
them without a remedy on account of the cost-asymmetry between them and the 
well-to-do defendants. 
 
II. The Inequities and Inefficiencies of the Current Regime 
Whether you succeed or fail in litigating a case should not depend on how rich 
you are. But it does. As famously stated by Marc Galanter, under our system of 
litigation, the haves come out ahead.84 This advantage is morally inequitable and 
economically inefficient. Every legal right must be vindicated in litigation in order 
to afford its holder the protection it was designed to provide. When a rightholder 
is financially unable to vindicate the right in court, it is rendered meaningless.85 
For example, a property right is of no value to its holder if she cannot enforce it 
against a trespasser; a right arising from a contract is of no use to a contracting 
party when she cannot afford prosecuting a suit in the case of a breach; and a 
right under a homeowner’s “all damage” insurance policy is ineffectual when the 
home needs to be promptly rebuilt after being destroyed by a hurricane, but the 
insurance company, instead of paying the homeowner the requisite amount, drags 
her into a protracted and expensive litigation she can ill-afford.  
Each of these examples—and there are many others86—results in an inequitable 
outcome: the rightholder does not get her due or, alternatively, gets paid belatedly 
after suffering irreparable harm. This state of affairs is not only unjust, but also 
inefficient because it encourages unilateral violations of rights. As a result, 
                                                   
82  See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change 
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (explaining path-dependence in the 
workings of common law). 
83  See Wasserman, supra note 10, at 634–49. 
84  See Galanter, supra note 14, at 149 (“[T]he legal system tends to confer interlocking advantages 
on overlapping groups whom we have called the ‘haves.’”). 
85  See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1314, 1371 (arguing that when the cost of 
vindicating a right is exceeds the cost of attacking it, the challenger can prevent the 
rightholder from realizing the right, thereby rendering it meaningless). 
86  See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 12, at 1335–52. 
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numerous laws that have been put in place to advance social welfare by vesting 
rights in individuals fall short of achieving their goal to the detriment of 
rightsholders and society at large. 
Surprisingly, this profound problem has not been systemically addressed by 
scholars and policymakers. This omission is attributable to the problem’s 
formulation as a subset of the general problem of access to justice. The access-to-
justice philosophy calls for the removal of barriers blocking an ordinary person’s 
way to court, with the “barriers” being a factor extraneous to court proceedings. 
To remove these barriers, policymakers have implemented several mechanisms 
that included contingency fees,87 litigation funding,88 and class actions.89  
Essentially, each of these mechanisms provides plaintiffs with a source of funding. 
Contingency fees and litigation funding provide select plaintiffs a nonrefundable 
                                                   
87  See Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 
19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 295 (1999) (“[t]he contingency fee system clearly increases 
client access to the justice system” by “provid[ing] financing and risk-shifting benefits”); 
Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 728 (2010) (“[T]he 
endorsement of the contingency fee mechanism opened the doors of justice to indigent and 
lower-class plaintiffs who otherwise would have been unable to obtain legal services . . . .”); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
593, 598 (2012) (stating that contingency-fee arrangements remove cost barriers restricting 
low-income plaintiffs’ access to justice and risk barriers restricting risk-averse plaintiffs’ access 
to justice). 
88   See Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation Funding-A Signaling Model, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 234 (2014) (“Proponents of third-party funding mention the increased 
access to justice for plaintiffs—which allows them to avoid settling prematurely due to their 
need for cash.”); Bruno Deffains & Claudine Desrieux, To Litigate or Not to Litigate? The Impacts of 
Third-Party Financing on Litigation, 43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 178, 180 (2015) (stating that third 
party financing can promote access to justice by enabling credit-constrained plaintiffs to sue 
and remedying financial disparities that may prevent plaintiffs from recovering); Maya 
Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1276 
(2011) [hereinafter Litigation Funding] (“[T]hird-party funding promotes access to justice by 
enabling plaintiffs who have meritorious cases to bring litigation they would otherwise be 
unable to bring and to avoid premature settlements at a discount due to the exhaustion of 
funds.”). 
89  See Wilber H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue and Cy Pres Awards: 
Emerging Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 267, 291 (2014) (“One 
interest of . . . class action . . . is access to justice for a group of litigants who, on their own, 
would not realistically be able to seek court relief, either because it would be too inefficient to 
adjudicate each injured party’s claim separately or because it would be cost prohibitive for 
each injured party to file individual claims.”); Catherine Piché, Public Financiers As Overseers of 
Class Proceedings, 12 N.Y.U.  J. L. & BUS. 779, 791 (2016) (“[B]y distributing fixed litigation 
costs amongst a large number of class members, class actions improve access to justice by 
making economical the prosecution of claims that any one class member would find too costly 
to prosecute on his or her own.”). 
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loan: a sum of money sufficient for financing the filing and prosecution of the 
plaintiff’s suit, which will only be returned, along with a very high interest, if the 
plaintiff wins the case and recovers enough money from the defendant.90 Class 
actions do more or less the same after consolidating a large number of individually 
nonviable suits into a collective action that takes advantage of the suits’ similarities 
and the resulting economies of scale.91 
Under the aforementioned mechanisms, the money that plaintiffs get to advance 
their suits comes from their attorneys and litigation funders. Remarkably, none of 
these mechanisms attempts to use the defendant as a source of funding and to take 
care of the internal barrier to justice: the impecunious plaintiffs’ inability to carry 
out a prolonged and expensive legal battle against defendants well-equipped to 
wage such a battle. Consequently, these mechanisms, despite the improvements 
they introduced into our legal system, have been of little help to impecunious 
plaintiffs. Contingency-fee representation and litigation funding only avail 
plaintiffs whose suits are sufficiently promising and fit within the attorneys’ and 
the funders’ economic models.92 Class actions are only open for suits that are 
similar enough to meet the typicality and commonality requirements.93 Moreover, 
                                                   
90   See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS 33–39 (2011); Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee 
Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1380 (1996) ([L]awyers charge a premium . . . [which] 
compensates for the risk of nonpayment if the suit does not succeed . . . .”) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735–36 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds)); Litigation Funding, supra note 88, at 1276 (“A 
typical contingency fee would be between twenty and fifty percent of the damages, with a cap 
of three to four times the legal costs advanced by the funder.”) (quoting BAKER & MCKENZIE 
LLP, DEMAND FOR THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING RISES AS SUPPLY BECOMES 
VOLATILE (2008), http:// www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/427586D3-6891-4FC2-B926-
B0181DB75595/0/third_ party_litigation_funding_ca&uscore;oct08.pdf.). 
91  See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1992, 2027 (2012) (“By aggregating a large number of small claims, attorneys make 
representation affordable by maximizing economies of scale. Moreover, by resolving common 
questions of law and fact in a single proceeding, class actions and other aggregate procedures 
improve efficiency and ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated parties.”); see also Alon 
Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 69, 76 (2004) (“[C]lass action . . . facilitates compensation for wrongs committed 
against large groups of individuals when each individual wrong is too small to justify the costs 
of rectification through legal process.”). 
92  See Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The 
Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 950 (2015) (“Third-party 
litigation financiers invest only in cases with millions to tens of millions of dollars at stake and 
between incredibly sophisticated parties. Litigation funds can afford few failed investments for 
an entire fund family to collapse.”). 
93  See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 441, 475 (2013) (stating that commonality certainly requires more than a class 
that merely shares common questions of law); John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action 
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under each of these mechanisms, a deserving plaintiff must fork over a substantial 
share of the recovery amount to her attorney or funder.94 Consequently, the 
remedy that the plaintiff can receive at the end of the day falls way below the 
amount needed to make him whole. 
To see why defendants, too, should become a source for funding potentially 
meritorious suits, policymakers and scholars should not focus only on the typical 
plaintiff and her plight. They should also evaluate the situation of a typical 
corporate defendant. What makes this situation distinctive is not merely the 
extreme disparity between the plaintiff’s limited financial resources and the 
defendant’s wealth, but also, indeed primarily, the presence of economies of scale 
and scope on the defendant’s side.95 These economies arise from the fact that 
many corporate defendants are repeat players in the litigation field. They employ 
in-house lawyers and have ready access to experts and documents. Consequently, 
their defense costs per case drop with every suit they litigate.96 What is more, suits 
filed against them involve similar legal issues. For example, suits against insurance 
companies typically give rise to the same interpretation challenges. Addressing 
them once dramatically lowers the cost of tackling them again. No such 
economies exist on the plaintiffs’ side. 
These asymmetries are a cause for grave concern. A party who can litigate more 
cost-effectively can use her advantage to force her adversary to drop the case or 
agree to an unfavorable out-of-court settlement. Consider the following example. 
Assume that the plaintiff has a 60 percent chance of winning a $100,000 suit 
against the defendant, so that the expected value of her suit is $60,000. The 
plaintiff’s litigation cost is $40,000. The expected cost for the defendant is only 
$20,000 on account of the economies of scale and scope. The defendant can offer 
the plaintiff to settle the case for $20,000, and if the plaintiff is a rational self-
interest maximizer, she will accept that offer. Note that if the litigation costs were 
                                                                                                                                           
Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1424 (2003) (“Typicality [means that] [t]he named 
plaintiff is not permitted to represent the class unless his interest is essentially the same as those 
of the unnamed members of the class. . . . The commonality requirement serves the same 
purpose . . . .”). 
94   See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 12, at 1343 (finding that “disadvantaged victims of 
medical malpractice cannot secure adequate representation [on a contingent fee basis] unless 
they fork over a substantial fraction of their recovery to their lawyers”). 
95  Id. at 1343, 1344, 1359 (finding that insurance companies, banks, and defendants in medical 
malpractice all enjoy significant economies of scale and scope that are unavailable to 
plaintiffs). 
96  This effect is known in the literature as “economies of scale.” See N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 272–73 (6th ed. 2009). 
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equal, that is, if the defendant, too, were to pay its attorneys $40,000, the case 
would have settled for $40,000.97  
Our numerical example is not merely a theoretical nicety. It reflects the reality 
many plaintiffs face. Indeed, in certain industries, such as insurance and health 
care, it has become the norm. Consider the insurance industry first. A study 
carried out by the American Association for Justice (the AAJ)98 has revealed that a 
number of big insurance companies use the “deny, delay, defend” strategy in 
handling claims.99 Industry insiders commonly refer to this strategy as the “three 
Ds.”100 The company begins with a simple “sit and wait” reaction to an insured’s 
claim that leads many policyholders to give up their claims, while prompting 
others to hire an attorney to represent them.101 Another strategy is to give awards 
to adjusters who deny most claims regardless of the claims’ merit.102 These and 
other unsavory strategies enable insurance companies to force  their insureds to 
choose between lowball offers and extended (and expensive) litigation.103 For a 
rational, yet disempowered, insured, this Hobson’s choice means that she must 
accept the offer. Indeed, as Professor Jay Feinman observes in his important 
                                                   
97  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the parties’ information about the case and the costs 
is symmetrical. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes 
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989) (explaining how rational actors reach 
settlements under symmetrical information).  
98  AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, THE TEN WORST INSURANCE COMPANIES IN 
AMERICA: HOW THEY RAISE PREMIUMS, DENY CLAIMS, AND REFUSE INSURANCE TO 
THOSE WHO NEED IT MOST (2008) [hereinafter The AAJ Report). For articles with similar 
findings, see Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and 
Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1430–31 (1994) (arguing on empirical 
grounds that “insurance companies . . . engage in strategic behavior with third-party 
claimants” and systematically underpay claims); Leon E. Trakman, David Meets Goliath: 
Consumers Unite Against Big Business, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 617, 623 (1994) (“Insurance 
companies consistently underpay valid insurance claims to horde the difference between the 
amount due to each insured and the amount actually paid.”); David Dietz & Darrell Preston, 
Home Insurers’ Secret Tactics Cheat Fire Victims, Hike Profits, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2007), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=21070001&sid=aIOpZROwhvNI (observing that insurance companies 
systematically underpay claims and providing examples). For additional examples, see Kelsey 
D. Dulin, Comment, The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance Companies’ Post-Catastrophe Claims 
Handling Practices, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 189, 191–92, 196–206 (2008) (explaining and illustrating 
how insurance companies take advantage of catastrophe victims and underpay claims); see also 
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313, 1322–23 (Ariz. 1988) (admitting 
into evidence an insurer’s statements in settlement negotiations to show that it attempted to 
strong-arm the policyholder into a cheap settlement). 
99  The AAJ Report, supra note 98, at 2. 
100  Id. at 3. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. at 2–3. 
103  Id. at 3. 
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book,104 beginning in the 1990s, many major insurance companies turned their 
claims departments into profit centers.105 Instead of profiting from their superior 
expertise in pricing and spreading the risks of accidents, those companies generate 
most of their profit from breaking the insurer’s fundamental promise to indemnify 
the insured for losses covered by the policy.106 By forcing the insured into a cheap 
settlement, the companies also prevent courts from developing socially valuable 
precedents.107  
Another paradigmatic example comes from the health plans industry. Under a 
standard provision of most health benefits plans, a patient requiring specialized 
care must apply to the plan’s provider and ask it to approve the sought-after 
treatment. This procedure is known as precertification or utilization review.108 
Oftentimes, providers refuse to grant approval, a refusal that marks the beginning 
of the patient’s tribulations as a potential plaintiff in a suit for health benefits. 
Given the high cost of medical procedures, most patients cannot afford to pay out 
of pocket for the treatment and seek reimbursement later. Consequently, instead 
of going to a hospital to receive a much-needed treatment, many patients have no 
choice but to take their case to court and become plaintiffs. In that capacity, they 
are bound to encounter a virtually insurmountable time problem. Under the 
applicable statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), an aggrieved patient must file her suit in a federal court, where there are 
no fast tracks for plaintiffs who sue health benefit providers.109 Worse yet, the 
patient may not even be able to file that suit because her health benefits plan, 
similar to many others’, may contain a compulsory arbitration requirement. 
Bypassing this requirement is well-nigh impossible: Section 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act,110 as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,111 
                                                   
104   JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY 
CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010). 
105  Id. at 5. 
106  Id. 
107  See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (unfolding principled account of 
settlements’ inherent inequity). 
108  See DARLENE BRILL, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH INSURANCE 42 (1999). 
109  See, e.g., LARRY E. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 624 (4th ed. 2009) 
(attesting that provisional remedies can only be granted “to preserve the status quo pending 
the court’s determination of the parties’ rights or to insure that sufficient resources will be 
available to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim if the plaintiff ultimately prevails” and that the available 
provisional remedies include “attachment, garnishment, sequestration, replevin, temporary 
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions [and] civil arrest”). 
110  Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883, codified as amended at 9 USC §1 et seq. 
111  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,  339–44 (2011) (holding that Federal 
Arbitration Act makes arbitration clauses broadly enforceable and puts an end to “the judicial 
hostility towards arbitration that . . . had manifested itself in ‘a great variety’ of ‘devices and 
formulas’ declaring arbitration against public policy” (quoting  Robert Lawrence Co. v. 
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mandates arbitration. Arbitration may proceed faster than a court proceeding, but 
it will pose another serious problem for the plaintiff: the arbitrator’s incentives are 
inimical to her plight. To compete with courts that enjoy public subsidization and 
need not attract paying customers, arbitrators must deliver decisions that will be 
agreeable to the parties in the arbitration. This incentive drives arbitrators 
towards striking a compromise that splits the disputed amount between the 
parties, while avoiding making decisions that constitute a complete victory for one 
party and an unmitigated defeat for her opponent.112 To make matters worse, 
arbitrators who seek to maximize their revenues may try to appease the repeat 
player in the arbitration, namely, the health plan provider.  
Plaintiffs willing to overcome these hurdles need to secure adequate legal 
representation. However, hiring an experienced ERISA attorney would be 
anything but cheap. The plaintiff’s attorney will offer her no fee discounts 
comparable to those offered to the healthcare plan provider, whose representation 
is characterized by economies of scope and scale. The provider’s legal 
representatives will be sure to take advantage of this cost asymmetry and force the 
plaintiff to accept an unfavorable settlement. The fact that ERISA entitles 
successful plaintiffs to recover their attorney’s fees from the plan’s provider after 
winning the case113 does not affect this analysis. Belated reimbursement of 
attorney fees cannot provide the plaintiff the requisite medical treatment when she 
needs it. Furthermore, the prospect of reimbursing the plaintiff for her attorney’s 
fees only motivates the plan’s provider to slightly improve its cheap settlement 
offer. 
The legal dynamics we describe generate another negative result: they impede the 
development of the law in certain areas. Settlements extracted by powerful 
corporate defendants are different from the standard settlements discussed in the 
literature. Their distribution across legal domains is slanted rather than random. 
                                                                                                                                           
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959))); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 623, 658–60 (2012) (criticizing Supreme Court for broadly validating arbitration 
provisions, including those that contain class action waivers). 
112  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
235, 238 (1979) (analyzing arbitrators’ economic incentives); see also Alex Stein, The Incentives to 
Arbitrate Medical Malpractice Disputes, BILL OF HEALTH (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/29/the-incentives-to-arbitrate-medical-
malpractice-disputes/ (showing that arbitrators have an incentive to deliver a settlement, 
rather than a binary “all or nothing,” type of verdict). 
113  See 29 U.S.C § 1132(g)(1) (“In any action under this subchapter . . . by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and 
costs of action to either party.”). 
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Such settlements tend to concentrate in particular areas, such as healthcare, 
insurance, and financial services, where they distort the path of law.114  
The existence of a positive correlation between wealth and access to legal 
representation is a well-known fact. Our analysis points to the existence of a 
feedback loop between litigation and substantive rights, which prevents the ability 
of poor victims to vindicate their rights in court. Critically, both phenomena share 
the same root cause: insufficient funding. As we will show, this problem is not 
insoluble. Oddly, the literature that addressed the problem to date focused on the 
wrong solutions: it looked for third parties to come to the aid of financially 
constrained victims. As we will show, a more promising path is to focus on the 
wrongdoer. Enter preliminary damages. 
III. A New Remedy: Preliminary Damages 
After explaining and documenting the inequities and inefficiencies of our civil 
litigation system in its current form, in this Part, we propose a remedy to these 
ailments in the form of preliminary damages. We argue that the introduction of 
preliminary damages into the menu of remedies will make our legal system fairer 
and more efficient, especially insofar as disempowered plaintiffs are concerned. 
Furthermore, in order to safeguard against potential abuse of the new remedy, we 
develop a list of doctrinal prerequisites that must be satisfied prior to the award of 
preliminary damages.  
A. The Upside of Preliminary Damages 
Given that insufficient financial resources prevent economically disempowered 
victims from seeking justice, the search for a solution must focus on additional 
sources of funding. Naturally, a possible funding source is the wrongdoer, who in 
many cases is the direct cause of the economic plight of the victim. It is not 
atypical for victims of wrongdoings to suffer serious losses and incur additional 
expenses as a consequence of the wrongful act or omission that befell them.115 
Furthermore, even in those cases in which the economic plight of a victim 
predates the harm inflicted on her by the wrongdoer, it is undeniable that it is the 
wrongful act or omission that forced the victim to litigate and freighted her with 
the cost that comes with filing and prosecuting a suit. Had the wrong not 
occurred, the plaintiff might well have been impecunious but would not have had 
to litigate. It is precisely for this reason that corrective justice theorists maintain 
that the wrongdoer, and not society at large, must be the one to make the victim 
whole.116 This position is not reserved to corrective justice theorists, it is also the 
                                                   
114  Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 12, at 1335. 
115  See Wasserman supra note 3, at 629–31. 
116  See WEINRIB, supra note 32, at 56. 
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law. The law expects wrongdoers to make their victims whole by paying them full 
compensation for the losses they suffered from the wrongdoer.117 
In those cases where compensation is not paid without a trial,  it follows that the 
wrongdoer who harmed the victim in the first place and then refused to 
compensate her without a trial, should also bear the victim’s loss.118 At this point, 
one may intercede and respond that although the wrongdoer must compensate 
the victim for her losses at the end of the trial, if so ordered by a court, funding the 
victim’s legal battle is not part of the wrongdoer’s duty. The two costs, so the 
argument goes, are analytically distinct. This argument misses the mark insofar as 
it purports to set aside preliminary damages. Preliminary damages are a form of 
compensation. Substantively, they are no different from permanent damages.119 
What separates preliminary damages from permanent damages is timing. 
Permanent damages are awarded at the end of the trial. Preliminary damages are 
awarded prior to the end of the trial. Preliminary damages, under our proposed 
design, are not a form of litigation funding. Rather, they are a compensation in 
advance that can be used by the plaintiff to sponsor the continuation of her legal 
battle, if the plaintiff chooses to do so.  
Furthermore, there exists universal consensus that at the end of a trial, the 
defendant must compensate the deserving plaintiff who proved her case. 
Therefore, if we are to take rights seriously, as Ronald Dworkin persuasively 
argued that we must,120 it would be anomalous to relieve a wrongdoer who 
through his actions or omissions forced a victim to incur expenditures on litigation 
of the duty to pay for this loss. The Dworkinian argument thus prefers the English 
rule  of “costs follow the event,”121 which obligates the losing party to reimburse 
the winning party for her litigation expenses, over the American rule under which 
each party pays his own expenses regardless of the outcome of the trial.122  
Our proposal is different. We advocate award in advance instead of cost-shifting 
for cases in which a prima facie deserving plaintiff has no access to justice. The 
Dworkinian argument supports our proposal by questioning the validity of the 
                                                   
117  DOBBS, supra note 8, § 2.1(2) at 55–59. 
118  Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney 
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327–28 (2013) 
(“The American rule for attorney fees requires each party to pay its attorney, win or lose; the 
English rule (applicable in most of the world) requires the losing party to pay the winner’s 
reasonable attorney fees.”). 
119  Cf. John J. Donohue, III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase 
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1102 (1991) (demonstrating that, from an 
economic standpoint, damages’ and costs’ awards are the same). 
120  DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 46 (1977). 
121  See Donohue, supra note 119, at 1099-1102. 
122  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
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claim that a prima facie wrongful defendant should not participate in funding the 
legal battle of the prima facie deserving plaintiff.  
From an efficiency perspective, the case for recognizing preliminary damages is 
equally compelling. Economic efficiency is primarily concerned with maximizing 
aggregate welfare.123 An efficiency-driven legal system therefore seeks to suppress 
socially suboptimal behaviors.124 While it is true that the payment of 
compensation is not important per se for efficiency-minded theorists, it is 
instrumental to the value of deterrence.125 Compensation requires actors to take 
account of the cost they impose on third parties.126 If an actor does not bear the 
full cost of her actions, there is no way of knowing that her behavior is optimal.127 
Only when an actor internalizes the full cost of her decisions, can we conclude 
that their actions are welfare enhancing.128 Hence, legal regimes that generate 
under-compensation are undesirable. Naturally, it is not enough for the law to 
stipulate that wrongdoers must compensate their victims for their full harm. By 
now, our readers are surely aware of the critical importance of the legal process to 
achieve the substantive goals of the law. If wealthy actors can use their superior 
resources to prevent impecunious victims from suing them altogether or to force 
them into unfair settlements, optimal deterrence cannot be achieved.  
The desire of strong defendants to force plaintiffs to settle by dragging out trials is 
undesirable for yet another reason: it depletes judicial resources. Rather than 
bringing cases to a quick resolution, well-financed defendants prefer to introduce 
delays into judicial processes in the hope that limited resources of plaintiffs will 
run out.129 We discussed this phenomenon at length in Part II above. The cost of 
this strategy is born in part by the litigants themselves, but another part of it falls 
on our court system and is borne by society at large. This is an additional problem 
that arises from the imbalance between wealthy corporate defendants and 
individual plaintiffs.  
Preliminary damages awards can rectify both problems. The introduction of 
preliminary damages will level the litigation playfield. It will allow victims who are 
short of money access to the superior resources of those who wronged them. This, 
in turn, will give the victims much needed breathing room. Furthermore, it will 
                                                   
123  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1-16, 128-38 (9th ed. 2014) 
124  Id. 
125  Id.  See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177–223 
(2004) 
126  See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (standard account of the 
internalization requirement). 
127  Id. at 5–6, 13. 
128  Id. 
129  See infra Part II. 
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allow them to hire better legal representation and manage their cases optimally, 
without yielding to financial pressures and extortionary tactics by strong 
defendants. Preliminary damages awards will go a long way toward eliminating 
the incentive of well-financed wrongdoers to delay legal processes in order to force 
weaker plaintiffs to accept unfavorable settlements.  
Clearly, there will be settlements under a preliminary damages regime. In fact, the 
introduction of preliminary damages might increase the number of settlements 
since their availability will lead defendants to settle early and save money.130 It is 
important to emphasize that not all settlements are equal.131 The terms of the 
settlements entered pursuant to an award of preliminary damages, or in their 
shadow, will be very different than the terms of settlements consummated in the 
absence of preliminary damages. The introduction of preliminary damages will 
dramatically enhance the bargaining power of individual plaintiffs and 
correspondingly the settlements they will be able to secure. Those settlements will 
normally yield to the plaintiff the expected value of her suit or a close amount—an 
outcome that improves social welfare.132 Hence, the case for recognizing 
preliminary damages is not limited to fairness arguments; there are also strong 
efficiency reasons to allow plaintiffs to receive preliminary damages. 
B. Prerequisites for Awarding Preliminary Damages 
It bears emphasis that we do not argue that preliminary damages should be 
awarded as a matter of course in all cases. In our opinion, preliminary damages 
should be a discretionary remedy, the grant of which will require proof of the 
same conditions as the award of preliminary injunctions, namely: (a) likelihood of 
success on the merits; (b) irreparable harm if preliminary damages are not 
awarded; (c) balance of equities tipping in favor of the plaintiff; and (d) an award 
of preliminary damages is consistent with the public interest.133 As with 
preliminary injunctions, the burden of proving these elements will lie with the 
plaintiff.134  
We view our reliance on the same conditions used by courts in deciding whether 
to grant preliminary injunctions is intentional as a key strength of our scheme. 
The use of the same criteria will substantially facilitate the implementation of our 
proposal. Courts are adept at making preliminary injunction decisions.135 
                                                   
130   See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 97 at 1070–75 (showing how symmetrical information 
about the suit’s expected value induces rational parties to settle the case out of court). 
131  Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of 
Settlement, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 489, 493 (1999). 
132  Id. 
133  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
134  Id. 
135  See Warren & Schwartz, supra note 74, at 388-90. 
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Furthermore, there exists a vast body of judicial precedents about each of the 
conditions that must be satisfied for a preliminary injunction to be issued.136 Our 
proposal harnesses the judicial expertise and caselaw that was developed in the 
context of preliminary injunctions in order to make our proposal readily 
implementable.  
That said, there exists a critical difference between preliminary injunctions and 
preliminary damages. Preliminary injunctions require courts to engage in a binary 
decision: they can either grant a preliminary injunction or not grant it. In the 
former case, the plaintiff’s wish is granted in full; and in the latter, the defendant’s. 
This is not the case with preliminary damages. Preliminary damages allow courts 
to split the difference by making in-between decisions. A court need not award a 
plaintiff the full amount she requests even if all of the aforementioned conditions 
are met; it can lower the preliminary damages amount in order to ensure that the 
plaintiff complies with the abovementioned conditions. For example, if a court 
believes that granting the plaintiff $500,000 in preliminary damages would be 
unfair to the defendant, it can settle for a $300,000 award. Preliminary damages 
open up a whole range of options that are not on the table in the case of 
preliminary injunctions. For this reason, we argue that courts should not rush to 
reject preliminary damages requests. Rather, they can fashion damages awards in 
ways that will do justice to both parties, subject to the conditions we set forth 
below. 
(1) Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
The first condition a plaintiff would need to prove in order to receive preliminary 
damages is that her case is likely to succeed on the merits.137 This is an 
indispensable requirement. If a court believes that a suit has no merit, no 
preliminary remedy should be awarded. Awarding a preliminary remedy in such 
cases is not only unfair to the defendant, but also wasteful. If a plaintiff cannot 
prove that she is likely to succeed on the merits, it makes no sense to prolong the 
proceedings at the defendant’s expense. Judicial resources are scarce and should 
be allocated in a principled way. Granted, every litigant has the right to use her 
own resources to litigate. Yet, there is no reason to fund unmeritorious actions, let 
alone frivolous suits.  
A possible argument could be made here that even if the plaintiff fails to prove a 
likelihood of success on the merits, it may still make sense to give her a chance to 
continue to litigate by awarding her a very small amount of money. For example, 
if the court estimates that a plaintiff has 10% chance of winning, it can award her 
                                                   
136  Id. 
137   Id. See also Bethany M. Bates, Reconciliation after Winter: The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions in 
Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1556 (2011). 
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a fraction of the preliminary damages amount she seeks. We cannot endorse this 
idea. The award of any amount of preliminary damages in non-meritorious cases 
exposes the defendant to an unjustified risk of non-payment. When a case is 
unlikely to succeed on the merits, there is no reason to expose defendants to this 
risk. Moreover, when a case is unlikely to be successful, it is almost certain that the 
plaintiff will need to return the money to the defendant. Transfers of money are 
not costless, however, especially for individual defendants. Also, it should be 
remembered that judicial resources are scarce. A lawsuit should not be thought of 
as a lottery ticket. Allocating judicial time to cases that stand no real chance of 
success on the merit comes at a cost to meritorious plaintiffs and the public at 
large. Judicial time and effort should be allotted in a way that takes the likely final 
outcome into account. Postponing the likely end in the case of non-meritorious 
suits by awarding plaintiffs small amounts in preliminary damages is at odds with 
sound principles of judicial administrability. 
Furthermore, we are also concerned that under a regime that does not maintain a 
strict requirement of probability of success on the merits, courts may be tempted 
to grant preliminary damages to plaintiffs in all or most cases out of compassion or 
sympathy.138 Unlike the case with preliminary injunctions, where courts face an 
all-or-nothing decision and understand that if they issue an unwarranted 
injunction it will severely harm the defendant, in the context of preliminary 
damages, courts may choose to give plaintiffs a small amount and see how the 
case plays out. While we understand this impulse, the rules of evidence and civil 
procedure must be honored.  Hence, we are of the view that unless we adopt a 
probabilistic recovery regime, under which all remedies are prorated based on 
different degrees of proof,139 preliminary damages should always be withheld 
when a plaintiff cannot prove that her suit is likely to succeed. We maintain that 
this is a key prerequisite that must be strictly enforced by courts. 
(2) Irreparable Harm to Plaintiff from Denial of Preliminary 
Damages 
A second element a plaintiff would need to prove to qualify for preliminary 
damages is that she stands to suffer irreparable harm if her request for preliminary 
damages is denied.140 The irreparable harm inquiry should focus on the plaintiff’s 
financial situation and her ability to continue with the lawsuit if her request for 
preliminary damages is denied. Accordingly, to prove irreparable harm, the 
                                                   
138  Cf. Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 591 (1985) 
(arguing that compassion for accident victims combined with the comparative loss-bearing 
abilities of tort defendants leads judges to see tort law as a mechanism for victim 
compensation). 
139  For pros and cons of such a regime, see STEIN, supra note 37 at 143–53. 
140  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
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plaintiff needs to show that she cannot self-finance the lawsuit or find external 
funding without undue burden. In other words, we would require a showing that 
the plaintiff cannot finance the litigation without making unreasonable sacrifices. 
We do not believe that the bar should be set higher than that.   
Courts should not force victims to sell their home, switch jobs or take exorbitant 
loans to finance litigation. The reason is simple: if the plaintiff showed that she is 
likely to succeed on merits, she is likely to be awarded compensation from the 
defendant at the end of the trial. The compensation she is going to receive ought 
to cover all of her expenses including her attorney’s fees. There is no point, 
therefore, in forcing the plaintiff to incur unnecessary costs and then order the 
defendant to pay them. More importantly, if it is apparent that the defendant 
wronged the plaintiff and will be ordered to compensate her, there is no 
prudential reason to bar the plaintiff to collect a portion of the compensation 
award earlier.  
The plaintiff can prove her financial plight by sharing information about her 
income, property and savings, as well as about her medical, legal and general 
expenses with the court. It must be borne in mind that plaintiffs must share much 
of the same documentation anyhow to plead their case and prove their harm. 
Accordingly, the evidential requirements that attend our proposal do not impose a 
significant burden on plaintiffs.  
Here, too, the fact that money awards can adjust upward and downward plays an 
important role. Courts need not automatically grant the plaintiff the full amount 
she requests. For example, if a plaintiff seeks preliminary damages in the amount 
of $180,000, and the court finds that a grant of $100,000 suffices to prevent an 
irreparable harm to the plaintiff, it should order the payment of the latter amount. 
That said, courts should give plaintiffs some leeway. Setting the preliminary 
damages award at the bare minimum runs the risk that it might be insufficient. It 
must be remembered that legal proceedings often take longer than expected and 
can involve unforeseen developments. Courts must take these scenarios into 
account when ruling on preliminary damages requests. It is, of course, possible to 
allow plaintiffs to seek preliminary damages more than once and require plaintiffs 
to show that they meet the relevant criteria every time they file such a request. 
Although we do not rule this option out completely, allowing the plaintiff to seek 
preliminary damages multiple times will consume judicial resources and prolong 
legal proceedings. For this reason, we suggest that preliminary damages should be 
awarded just once, but courts should err on the side of safety—in this case, is the 
plaintiff’s side—in setting the amount of these damages. 
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(3) Balance of Equities Tipping in Plaintiff’s Favor 
The third condition for awarding preliminary damages focuses on the balance of 
equities.141 It would require the plaintiff to show that the harm she will sustain if 
her request for preliminary damages is denied will be greater than the harm the 
defendant stands to suffer if preliminary damages are granted. This comparison 
lies at the heart of preliminary injunction decisions, and it is also central to our 
proposal.  
Although we believe that individual plaintiffs should be able to receive preliminary 
damages, it must be borne in mind that not all defendants can pay them. The line 
should be drawn between well-to-do corporate defendants and cash strapped 
individual defendants. Defendants that fall into the former group will, by and 
large, be able to comply with a court order to pay preliminary damages. 
Defendants from the latter group face a very different situation. An order to pay 
preliminary damages may spell doom for poor defendants. Litigation may push 
poor defendants to the abyss of bankruptcy. One should also bear in mind that 
poor defendants may be worse off than poor plaintiffs since poor defendants do 
not even have the option of deciding whether to litigate or not. The need to 
comply with an interlocutory order to pay money to the plaintiff may push certain 
individual defendants over the edge. Hence, courts must carefully examine the 
ability of defendants to pay preliminary damages and the effect of a preliminary 
damages award on their ability to continue to function and defend themselves in 
court.  
Once again, there is a critical difference between preliminary injunctions and 
preliminary damages. Almost always, a court can adjust the preliminary damages 
amount so as to ensure that the balance of equities tips in favor of the plaintiff. 
Yet, the flexibility that characterizes preliminary damages is not infinite. There is 
a limit to the courts’ ability to adjust preliminary damages awards downwards. 
Courts should be wary not to set the amount too low. If the preliminary damages 
award is set too low, it will be of little help to the plaintiff as it will not enable her 
to see her case through. Accordingly, courts must be circumspect not to lower 
preliminary damages awards too much. 
At the same time, courts must also offer adequate protection to the interests of 
defendants. The main risk preliminary damages pose to defendants is the risk of 
non-repayment if they win the case in the end. It is impossible to rule out the 
possibility that even if a plaintiff shows that she is likely to succeed on the merits, 
at the end of the trial, a court will rule for the defendant. Under this scenario, the 
defendant may sometimes be able to retrieve her money from the plaintiff. Yet, if 
the plaintiff used the preliminary damages to finance the litigation, she would not 
                                                   
141  Id. 
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be able to repay the defendant right away, if ever. To address this risk, we propose 
that preliminary damages be capped at 40% of the total damages sought by the 
plaintiff. Hence, if a plaintiff sues for $1,000,000, the court will be able to award 
her up to $400,000 in preliminary damages. At this point, we want to remind our 
readers that under our proposal, courts will always have the discretion to award 
less than 40%.  
(4) The Award of Preliminary Damages is Consistent with the 
Public Interest 
The final prerequisite for the award of preliminary damages is that it is consistent 
with the public interest.142 We should note at the outset that concern for the 
public interest will arise in some cases where preliminary damages are sought, but 
not in all of them. Concern with public interest is a paramount consideration in 
constitutional cases, suits against administrative agencies and in the domain of 
international human rights.143 Litigation in the aforementioned areas often 
involves requests for preliminary injunctions and the decision whether to grant 
them implicates the public interest.144 Clearly, if our proposal is adopted, plaintiffs 
in all areas will take advantage of it. On our view, preliminary damages should be 
available across the board and should benefit all plaintiffs who meet the criteria 
for their award. Accordingly, in suits against the government that involve a 
request for preliminary damages, courts must consider the impact of the request 
on the public interest before deciding whether to grant it. In standard civil 
litigation, the public interest will not always come into play. For example, a 
contractual dispute between two private parties typically implicates no public 
interest. 
Of course, public interest concerns may arise in civil litigation as well. In mass 
torts cases,145 as well as in cases involving violations of consumer protection 
laws146 and securities class actions,147 to mention just a few,148 issues of public 
interest may arise. Since we believe that the introduction of preliminary damages 
                                                   
142  Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (courts granting injunctive 
relief in patent infringement suits must consider the public interest). 
143  See generally Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891 
(2008). 
144  Id. 
145   See David Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort 
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 929 (1984). 
146  See, e.g., David J. Dove, Washington Consumer Protection Act—Public Interest and the Private Litigant, 
60 WASH. L. REV. 201 (1984). 
147  See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 539 
(1997) (“Substantial shareholders may also have litigation incentives that reflect general social 
welfare.”). 
148  See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (eligibility for welfare benefits). 
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serves the public interest as it makes our court system fairer and more efficient, we 
suggest that courts adopt a rebuttable presumption that preliminary damages 
awards are consistent with the public interest and place the burden on defendants 
to rebut this presumption. 
IV. Addressing Potential Objections 
In this Part, we address three possible objections to our proposal. The first 
objection maintains that the introduction of preliminary damages would impose a 
significant cost on our court system by adding another stage to many trials. The 
second objection holds that the existence of litigation funds renders our proposal 
superfluous: plaintiffs in need of money can simply turn to external funds.149 The 
third and final objection alludes to fairness: arguably, the introduction of 
preliminary damages would be unfair to defendants because if a defendant 
ultimately prevails he might not be able to retrieve the money she paid the 
plaintiff, who might become insolvent at that point.  While these arguments have 
surface appeal, they collapse upon close inspection. For the reasons explained 
below, neither each objection on its own, nor all of them collectively are weighty 
enough to derail our proposal. We address these objections in turn. 
A. The Social Cost of Preliminary Damages 
The first objection we consider falls under the heading of administrability. One 
can argue that the introduction of preliminary damages will invariably increase 
litigation costs and consume valuable judicial time, especially if interlocutory 
appeals are allowed.150 The introduction of preliminary damages would force 
judges to make liability determinations much earlier than they currently do before 
they fully assessed all the evidence and heard all relevant witnesses.151 Adding 
preliminary damages may therefore require judges to address the question of 
liability twice—once, when they assess the plaintiff’s request for preliminary 
monetary relief and then, again, after hearing the evidence.  
We believe that this argument is overstated. Although it is undeniable that 
recognition of preliminary damages would require judges to consider the liability 
                                                   
149  See supra notes 87 & 88 and sources cited therein. 
150  There are arguments for and against allowing interlocutory appeals. On the one hand, 
allowing such appeals would provide further protection to defendants. On the other hand, we 
believe that the mechanisms we propose strike the right balance between plaintiffs and 
defendants and thus there is no need for an interlocutory appellate review. We are grateful to 
Susan Steinman for drawing our attention to this issue. 
151  Cf. Zuckerman, supra note 50, at 370 (arguing that fast-track liability assessments in 
interlocutory proceedings can yield a socially positive tradeoff between quality and economy 
of court decisions). 
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issue twice, the marginal cost involved is quite low and the expected benefits will 
likely far outweigh the cost. This is so for several reasons.  
To begin with, it must be borne in mind that judges are no strangers to 
preliminary remedies. Preliminary injunctions have been part and parcel of our 
judicial system for centuries.152 The task judges are required to carry out in 
making decisions regarding preliminary injunctions is identical to the task they 
will have to perform in awarding preliminary damages. Preliminary injunction 
decisions require judges to assess the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the 
merits.153 The same is true of preliminary damages awards. The long experience 
judges have with preliminary injunctions indicates that they are adept at making 
tentative liability determinations prior to making their final decision. Hence, 
judges will not need additional training or an adjustment period in order to 
operationalize our proposal. Similarly, there is no reason to assume that judges 
will be more error prone in deciding preliminary damages requests than when 
ruling on preliminary injunctions. 
That being said, the introduction of preliminary damages would undoubtedly add 
to the number of cases that require interlocutory assessments of liability. This in 
turn would prolong trials; and even if the additional cost incurred in every 
individual case is small, the aggregate cost would likely be substantial.  
Our response to this argument is two-fold. First, although it is true that the 
addition of preliminary damages to the remedial list would increase the number of 
cases in which judges will need to make interlocutory liability decisions, it may 
actually conserve judicial resources. Although this argument may seem 
counterintuitive on first blush, it is not. The introduction of preliminary damages 
is likely to put an end to the delay tactics currently employed by powerful 
defendants. It would render such strategic behavior futile and counterproductive. 
This, in itself, can lead to significant savings of judicial resources. The experience 
we have with preliminary injunctions is instructive here as well. In many legal 
domains, the issuance of a preliminary injunction marks the end of the 
litigation.154 In the face of preliminary injunction against them, defendants, by 
and large, preferred to settle the case out of court instead of litigating it to final 
judgment.155 We expect a similar dynamic to unfold with respect to preliminary 
damages. A court’s decision to award preliminary damages to the plaintiff does 
                                                   
152  See supra notes 63, 64 & 71 and sources cited therein. 
153  See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
154  See, e.g., Erik A. Christiansen, Preliminary Injunctions Live or Die on Powerful Evidence of Wrongdoing, 
LITIGATION, Winter 2019, at 14, 17 (2019) (“Litigation often ends after a preliminary 
injunction is granted or denied, particularly in cases that have no quantifiable monetary 
damages.”). 
155  Id. 
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not only provide the plaintiff with much needed funding to carry on with her legal 
battle, but it also generates information about the likely outcome of the case. From 
the defendant’s perspective, it may well be wiser to settle the case under such 
circumstances than to continue to incur litigation costs and pay a much higher 
amount at the end of the proceeding.156 Critically, settlements entered by the 
parties when preliminary damages are awarded, or even in their shadow, would 
be much fairer to plaintiffs than those consummated now, in the absence of 
preliminary damages.157  
Second, a cost-benefit analysis of our proposal cannot focus solely on the cost of 
adjudicating cases. Rather, it must also account for the salutary effects of our 
proposal on primary behavior.158 From a purely economic perspective, the 
willingness of wrongdoers to cause harms to others depends on the expected cost 
associated with the wrong.159 When the wrongdoers expect to walk scot-free 
because they estimate that they will not be sued or that the victim will not be able 
to litigate to a final judgment, their incentive to break the law would be quite high. 
Similarly, when wrongdoers know that they can exhaust the victim and pay a 
relatively small fraction of the actual harm, they would go ahead and commit the 
wrong.160 Sadly, under the current legal regime, wrongdoers can be almost certain 
that many of their victims will either refrain from suing or refrain from litigating 
to a final judgment on account of their limited resources. Preliminary damages 
award will change this reality. Moreover, they will reverse it. The implementation 
of our proposal would enable victims to seek and obtain justice. Understanding 
this, potential wrongdoers would avoid harming others in the first place. This, in 
turn, will not only lead to a better society, but will also economize on judicial 
resources.  
So far, the discussion proceeded in purely utilitarian terms. Adding fairness and 
distributive justice considerations to our analysis bolsters the case for recognizing 
preliminary damages. As John Rawls cautioned, a just society cannot sit idly while 
the rights of its weak members are not adequately protected.161 He famously 
                                                   
156  See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 1070–75. 
157  See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
158  For the need to mind primary behavior in fashioning rules of procedure, see Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 518 (2010) (showing that evidentiary motivations often lead actors to engage in socially 
suboptimal behavior when doing so is likely to increase their chances of prevailing in court). 
159  See ROBERT COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING TORTS, 
CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 27 (2017) (arguing that when individuals properly assess 
their net private benefits from actions, and officials properly assess the actions’ external costs, 
optimal incentives can easily be set up by imposing liability equal to the externality). 
160  Id. 
161  See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 151 (“Inequalities are permissible when they maximize, or at least 
contribute to the long-term expectations of the least fortunate group in society.”). 
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argued that the institutions of our society must be designed to benefit the interest 
of its least well off members. Of course, in his writings, he did not refer to every 
legal doctrine. Yet, the problem we analyze is a systematic feature of the justice 
system, which is clearly one of the core institutions Rawls has in mind, as the title 
of his book attests. As we explained, if substantive legal protections are to be 
meaningful, the law must provide all individual members of our society the ability 
to utilize them.162 Therefore, from a deontological perspective, it can be argued 
that the inherent structural bias against poor victims ought to be rectified as a 
moral imperative. 
B. Litigation Funds 
Another possible objection that may be levelled  against our proposal is that it is 
rendered superfluous in light of the existence of various litigation funds.163 The 
crux of the argument is that plaintiffs can secure funding from third parties, such 
as litigation funds, and therefore there is no need for preliminary damages. Why 
should plaintiffs receive funding from defendants if they can get it from financial 
institutions that were set up specifically for this purpose?  
We believe that this criticism misses the mark. Not only does the presence of 
litigation funds not obviate our solution; it actually proves how pressing the 
problem we address is. Litigation funds are no saints. They are rational economic 
actors who respond to a market need. Their emergence and operation indicate 
that many meritorious plaintiffs do not have sufficient resources to sue. The 
service provided by litigation funds is not free of charge. As is the case with other 
financial intermediaries, those funds charge fees and interest for the money they 
provide. They do advance payments to litigants that helps those litigants to 
proceed in court, but they also collect a sizable share of the monetary award in 
exchange.164 
Furthermore, because litigation funds are self-interested economic actors with 
limited resources, they do not fund every action.165 Rather, they are highly 
selective in choosing which actions to fund.166 Consequently, they turn down 
many requests for funding.167 For this reason, the solution provided by litigation 
funds to the plight of poor individual plaintiffs is at once  very partial and very 
expensive. Worse yet, since the funders’ fee structure typically comprises a fixed 
                                                   
162  See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1314. 
163  See supra notes 87 & 88 and sources cited therein. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
REMEDY4LEASTWELLOFF.DOC 2/27/2021 9:16 PM 
2021]                          A Remedy for the Least Well-Off 33 
 
amount in addition to a percentage from the recovery, it constitutes a particularly 
poor deal for plaintiffs with relatively small claims.168 
In fact, preliminary damages address the shortcomings of litigation funds and can 
therefore complement them, but the hierarchy between the two options should be 
reversed.  Under our vision, preliminary damages would become a standard 
remedy in our legal system available to all plaintiffs who meet the conditions for 
their award. By contrast to litigation funds, the solution provided by preliminary 
damages is comprehensive. More importantly, our proposal would not require a 
plaintiff to fork over a significant share of her monetary award to a financial 
intermediary who sponsored her legal battle.169 Preliminary damages would 
enable her to secure a significant share of the money she needs at a significantly 
lower cost and without paying unnecessary fees. If a plaintiff needs additional 
money after she received preliminary damages, she can turn to litigation funds. 
It should also be noted that a court’s decision to award preliminary damages will 
provide an important signal to litigation funders that the suit is meritorious and 
worthy of funding.170 At present, litigation funders must assess the strength of 
various suits on their own. Once preliminary damages become available, the 
decision to award them would provide both sides to a litigation-funding 
agreement dependable information indicating that the suit is likely to succeed on 
the merits. 
C. Unfairness to Defendants 
The third, and final, objection to our proposal focuses on its effect on defendants. 
The crux of the argument here is that preliminary damages award would expose 
defendants to the risk of being unable to collect the amount they have advanced to 
plaintiffs at the end of the trial if they prevail. This risk is especially acute when 
plaintiffs do not have savings, property, or a steady source of income and thus 
may become judgement proof at the end of the trial. In such cases, the award of 
preliminary damages may create an unfair irreversible result for defendants.  
It should be noted at the outset that preliminary injunctions also generate 
irreversible results—in fact, they are much more likely to do so than preliminary 
damages on account of their binary nature—yet nobody argues that they should 
                                                   
168  Id. 
169  A clarification is in order here: we view litigation funds as inferior to preliminary damages, but 
we do not call for their abolition. Litigation funds can, and should, exist alongside preliminary 
damages. Those funds can prove useful to plaintiffs who for various idiosyncratic reasons need 
more money in the present than they can get in preliminary damages and for plaintiffs who 
are willing to trade a larger amount of future income for a smaller amount of present income. 
170  Cf. Avraham & Wickelgren, supra note 88, at 235 (advocating a method for eliciting 
information for courts through external funding of suits). 
REMEDY4LEASTWELLOFF.DOC 2/27/2021 9:16 PM 
34                    A Remedy for the Least Well-Off [Vol. nnn:nnn 
 
be banished. When a court issues a preliminary injunction against a defendant, it 
forces her to discontinue a certain activity. The economic consequences for the 
defendant are often harsh and irreversible: even if the defendant ultimately wins 
the case, oftentimes, she would not be able to recover compensation for her 
forgone profits. Moreover, as we already noted, in many legal contexts, a 
preliminary injunction practically marks the end of the case since defendants 
cannot afford to cease to operate.171 Yet, the accepted lore is that despite their 
irreversible effects, preliminary injunctions are needed to secure just results. 
Naturally, courts are well aware of the potential effect of preliminary injunctions 
on defendants and have adopted doctrinal safeguards to minimize those effects. 
We have incorporated the same safeguards into our proposal to offer adequate 
protection to defendants.  
Moreover, as we noted time and again, because preliminary injunctions are 
dichotomous in nature—in the sense that a court may either issue or deny an 
injunction—preliminary damages are subject to fine-tuning. Hence, with respect 
to preliminary damages, courts have two decisions to make: first, whether to 
award preliminary damages; and second, how much money to give. By lowering 
or raising the amount of preliminary damages, courts can strike the right balance 
between the interests of the parties based on the circumstances of each individual 
case. That they cannot do with preliminary injunctions. 
Admittedly, the doctrinal safeguards we proposed do not completely eliminate the 
risk of non-payment. Judges are not error-proof and the circumstances of 
individual litigants change. Hence, the risk of non-payment exists, but is relatively 
small and should not stand as bar to the adoption of our proposal. For the risk of 
non-payment to materialize, two cumulative misfortunes must occur. First, a court 
must err in evaluating the plaintiff’s probability of success on the merits. Second, 
the plaintiff must be judgement proof at the end of the trial, such that she cannot 
return the amount she was awarded even in the future. This combination of 
judicial error and insolvency is quite rare—and bear in mind that these two 
misfortunes need to occur in the same case. We therefore do not think that 
preliminary damages should be made unavailable solely because of this concern. 
Moreover, an undeserving plaintiff’s inability to return the preliminary award she 
received is as much of a problem for the defendant as a defendant’s insolvency for 
the deserving plaintiff. Our proposal leads to a more symmetrical allocation of the 
insolvency risk thereby making the litigation system more evenhanded. 
Before concluding, we would like to note that it is possible to adopt additional 
safeguards to offer more protection to defendants. One possible protective 
measure would be to limit the availability of preliminary damages to cases in 
                                                   
171  See Christiansen, supra note 154, at 17. 
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which the defendant’s liability is undisputed but the magnitude of the plaintiff’s 
loss is.172 This scenario refers to a conflict in which a defendant admits its liability, 
but argues that the victim deserves only $50,000 in compensation and not 
$300,000 as the victim claims. In such a case, a court can award $50,000 in 
preliminary damages to the plaintiff without exposing the defendant to any risk 
whatsoever; after all, the defendant itself acknowledged that she owes the plaintiff 
said amount.173 Similarly, if there were settlement negotiations between the 
parties and the wrongdoer offered to pay the victim a certain amount, the 
preliminary damages could be capped at that amount. Here, too, the award of 
statutory damages does not do injustice to the defendant. Another possible 
solution would combine preliminary damages with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68.174 The award of preliminary damages would be treated as the 
defendant’s payment offer, so if at the end of the trial the court does not award the 
plaintiff a greater amount, the plaintiff will be obligated to pay the defendant’s 
trial expenses. 
Conclusion 
In this Essay, we demonstrated the need for and the desirability of adding 
preliminary damages to the menu of remedies in civil actions. The unavailability 
of preliminary damages is a product of happenstance and history; yet, there is 
neither prudential or policy justification to deny preliminary damages in civil 
litigation. In fact, the opposite is correct. The award of preliminary damages 
would make our legal system more just and efficient. Indeed, the unavailability of 
preliminary damages works to the disadvantage of the least well-off: impecunious 
plaintiffs who suffered injustice at the hands of powerful and affluent defendants. 
Owing to severe financial constraints, financially constrained plaintiffs cannot 
afford prolonged and expensive litigation. By denying them the remedy of 
preliminary damages we deprive them of the most affordable option of financing 
their legal struggle: advance payment from the party who harmed them and 
forced them to litigate in the first place. The extant regime, in which preliminary 
damages are not available, creates another distortion: it provides strong 
                                                   
172  This method was adopted by the Israeli compensation system of compensating automobile 
accident victims: see Israeli Compensation Law, supra note 10; Perry, supra note 10, at 409–13. 
173  Arguably, implementation of this idea may lead defendants never to admit their liability or 
agree to pay excessively small amounts. This kind of strategic reaction is possible. Courts can 
counter such strategic behavior by obligating defendants to pay the plaintiff’s litigation 
expenses, and in extreme cases, punitive damages as well. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (reducing, but not voiding, state court’s imposition of 
multimillion punitive damages on insurance company for litigating strategically and in bad 
faith against the insured). 
174  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (allowing defendants to make an offer of judgment and recover costs 
when a plaintiff turns the correct offer down). 
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defendants with an incentive to drag out legal proceedings in order to force 
plaintiffs who can ill-afford long trials into unfavorable settlements.175 Therefore,  
the theoretic case for recognizing preliminary damages is compelling. 
Furthermore, we showed that under the conditions we specified, the case for 
granting preliminary damages is stronger than the case for issuing preliminary 
injunctions. Monetary awards, unlike injunctions, are infinitely flexible. They can 
be adjusted to the specific circumstances of each individual case. They can also be 
capped. Accordingly, courts would be able to calibrate awards in a way that 
would help plaintiffs without jeopardizing the financial stability of defendants. 
                                                   
175  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
